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RACE, CLASS, CASTE

. . .

? RETlllNKING

AFFIRMATIVE ACTION1
Clark D. Cunningham*
and N.R. Madhava Menon**
Many who oppose affirmative action programs in the United
States because they use "racial" categories such as black, African
American, or Latino, claim that equally effective and more equita
ble programs can be developed using only class categories, such as
"low income."2 A key test case for the "race v. class" debate is
admission to law schools, made urgent by recent legal prohibitions
on the use of "race" in the admission procedures to state universi
ties in California, Washington, and Texas.3 An empirical study by
Linda Wightman, the former director of research for the Law
School Admissions Council (LSAC), has shown that had a "race
blind" admissions process - based solely on undergraduate grade
point average (GPA) and scores on the national Law School
Admissions Test (LSAT) administered by the LSAC - been ap
plied to the group of persons entering law school in

1991,

ninety

* Professor of Law, Washington University in St. Louis. B.A. 1975, Dartmouth; J.D.
1981, Wayne State. - Ed. Email address: cunningc@law.wustl.edu.
** Member, Law Commission, Government of India. B.Sc. 1953, B.L. (Law) 1955,
Kerala; M.A. 1960, Punjab; LL.M. 1962, Aligarh Muslim; Ph.D. 1968, Aligarh Muslim - Ed.
This analysis is based on a longer paper written by Cunningham and Menon while Menon
was dean of the National Law School of India and does not necessarily reflect positions of
the Government of India.
1. This analysis and a response by Cass R. Sunstein, which appears at 97 MICH. L. REv.
1311 (1999), were the subject of a public panel discussion on September 9, 1998, at Washing·
ton University led by Professors Cunningham and Sunstein with comments by four other
Washington University faculty - Barbara Flagg (law), Pauline Kim (law), Sunita Parikh
(political science), and Robert Pollak (economics and business) - and subsequently on Janu
ary 14, 1999, of a faculty workshop sponsored by the Department of Government,
Dartmouth College. The authors thank the commentators and participants at those sessions
for their suggestions on the draft.
2. For a good summary and critique of the "class-based" alternative approach to affirma·
tive action, see Deborah C. Malamud, Class-Based Affirmative Action: Lessons and Caveats,
74 TEXAS L. REv. 1847 (1996).
3. The debate over law school admissions runs the risk of greatly oversimplifying the
variety of justifications for affirmative action. For example, it focuses more on the need of an
excluded group for access to a scarce resource than on the value to the larger society of
inclusion of many groups regardless of need; it also assumes that racist decisionmaking is no
longer a threat, surely a dangerous assumption in other contexts such as employment and
contracting. We use the law school admission problem only as an illustration, fully aware
that a nonracial approach that helps resolve that problem may not adequately address other
contexts where race-based affirmative action is now found.
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percent of those self-identified as "black" would not have been ad
mitted to any law school in the United States.4 Adding a prefer
ence based on socioeconomic factors to the GPA/LSAT criteria
would not have significantly increased the number of African
Americans because among applicants with similar socioeconomic
backgrounds, those self-identified as "white" significantly out
performed African Americans on the LSAT.5 One response to
such evidence as presented by Wightman's study is simply to argue
for the restoration of traditional racial categories to admission crite
ria. Another response, though, is to seek a new category to be used
to modify the GPA/LSAT criteria, a category that might correlate
lower performance on standardized testing with current social
structures more precisely than socioeconomic "class," yet would be
sufficiently distinguishable from the increasingly forbidden classifi
cation of "race." Such a category should be both theoretically co
herent and empirically grounded.

P roposals appearing in recent

legal scholarship to reinterpret the Fourteenth Amendment in
terms of an "anticaste" or "anti-pariah" principle appear to be one
attempt to develop such an alternative criteria: caste.
The use of "caste" in Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence
has, of course, a long tradition, with origins in the Reconstruction
Congressional debates on the Amendment,6 and most famously in
4. Linda F. Wightman, The Threat to Diversity in Legal Education: An Empirical Analy
sis ofthe Consequences ofAbandoning Race as a Factor in Law School Admission Decisions,

72 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1, 50-51 (1997). Wightman's analysis is supported by the actual experi
ence at the Texas Law School and the University of California Law School in Berkeley after
these schools were prohibited from using race as an admission criteria: the number of
African-American students admitted to the Texas Law School dropped from 65 in 1996 to 11
in 1997. Telephone Interview with M. Michael Sharlot, Dean, Unive:rsity of Texas Law
School (Mar. 9, 1999). At Berkeley, the number of African-American students admitted
went from 75 in 1996 to 14 in 1997. See Affirmative Action Loses Ground, ST.Louis Posr
DISPATCH, July 8, 1997, at B6. It is important to note that Wightman's study also indicates
that 78% of those black students admitted to law school in 1991 who would have been ex
cluded by using GPA/LSAT criteria did in fact graduate, and 73% of those black graduates
(who would have been excluded) did pass a bar examination. See Wightman, supra, at 36-38.
The 73% bar passage rate is a projection based on data available to Wightman.See id. at 37.
5.The mean LSAT score for black students was consistently seven to nine points lower
than white students of the same socioeconomic class for each of the four socioeconomic clas
sifications used.See Wightman, supra note 4, at 44. Indeed, the group of black law students
classified as "Upper Class" (both parents had graduate or professional training and held
professional jobs) had a mean LSAT score about six points lower than white law students in
the lowest classification, "Lower-Middle" (neither parent college-educated and both engaged
in blue collar work). See id. at 41-44.
6. See cass R. Sunstein, The Anticaste Principle, 92 MICH. L. REv. 2410, 2435 (1994)
("[T]he purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to ... '[do] away with the injustice of
subjecting one caste of persons to a code not applicable to another."' (second alteration in
original) (quoting CoNG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2766 (1866) (statement of Sen.
Howard))).
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Ferguson.7 Indeed, according to

one recent law review article, the word "caste" appears in thirty-six
Supreme Court cases.8 However, both the venerable and recent
references to "caste" fail to make explicit which features of
American society are thought to be analogous to the generally rec
ognized referent of "caste" - the traditional social structure of
India - an omission which particularly represents missed opportu
nity, given that India has a much longer legal history of affirmative
action jurisprudence than does the United States. Characterizing
the use of "caste" in American jurisprudence as "at best an effec
tive hyperbole" for "forms of unjust social hierarchy" rather than a
serious comparison with "true" caste societies, Jack Balkin has re
cently suggested that "caste" either be "jettison[ed]" or "serious[ly]
reapprais[ed]" as an explanatory category.9
We urge reappraisal rather than abandonment of the caste anal
ogy: a reappraisal that would prompt American legal scholars to
begin a long overdue look beyond their own borders for fresh ideas
on the affirmative action debate.10
CASS SUNSTEIN'S ANTICASTE PRINCIPLE

To illustrate, we will focus on one of the most influential and
extensively reasoned of these recent law review articles, The
Anticaste Principle, by Cass Sunstein.11

He proposes that the

7. The white race deems itself to be the dominant race in this country. And so it is, in
prestige, in achievements, in education, in wealth and in power. So, I doubt not, it will
continue to be for all time, if it remains true to its great heritage and holds fast to the
principles of constitutional liberty. But in view of the Constitution, in the eye of the law,
there is in this country no superior, dominant, ruling class of citizens. There is no caste
here. Our Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among
citizens.
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
8. See Daniel Farber & Suzanna Sherry, The Pariah Principle, 13 CONST. COMMENTARY
257, 270 n.59 (1996).
9.

J.M. Balkin, The Constitution of Status, 106 YALE L.J. 2313, 2358 (1997).

10. An important first step in this expansion of perspectives took place on November 810, 1997, when Washington University hosted an international conference, Rethinking Equal

ity in the Global Society, that brought together leading legal scholars, social scientists, and
policy makers from the United States, India, and South Africa, including Justice Jeevan
Reddy, author of the majority opinion in the most important Indian Supreme Court case on
affirmative action, Indra Sawhney v. Union ofIndia, A.I.R. 1993 S.C. 477 (India), and Profes
sor M.N. Srinivas, a distinguished Indian sociologist and the leading expert in the world on
the caste system. See Conference, Rethinking Equality in the Global Society, 75 WASH. U.
L.Q. 1561 (1997) [hereinafter Rethinking Equality Conference] (providing transcripts of the
plenary and panel sessions on the final day of the conference); Rethinking Equality in the
Global Society (visited Feb. 18, 1999) <http://ls.wustl.edu/Conferences/Equality> (publishing
conference papers by Cunningham & Menon, Reddy, and Govender (a South African
scholar), information about the participants, a bibliography, and related materials).
11. Sunstein, supra note 6.
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Fourteenth Amendment be reconceived, both as to original intent
and current application, in terms of what he calls "the anticaste
principle." This principle, as he defines it, would require that "so
cial and legal structures should not turn differences that are both
highly visible and irrelevant from the moral point of view into sys
tematic social disadvantages."12 In contrast to the dominant "anti
discrimination" interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment, the
anticaste principle does not treat affirmative action as a limited ex
ception to the constitutional guarantee of equality, but rather as a
logical, perhaps necessary, method of correcting the effects of caste,
which interfere with equality.
Sunstein seems to have several objectives in proposing this ap
proach. First, he is seeking a theoretically coherent and morally
appealing justification for affirmative action. Second, he wants to
offer a principled and empirically grounded basis for deciding which
groups should receive the benefits of affirmative action. Third, he
wants to shift greater responsibility and authority for implementing
the Fourteenth Amendment from the judiciary to the legislature
and executive.
Sunstein seems to believe that reconceiving the Fourteenth
Amendment in terms of eradicating caste rather than preventing
discrimination would change the affirmative action debate in two
fundamental ways. First, if, as Sunstein asserts, "the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution was [and should be] understood as
an effort to eliminate racial caste - emphatically not as a ban on
distinctions on the basis of race,"13 the range of persons who can
make Fourteenth Amendment claims would be drastically reduced
from the entire population (all of whom have a "race") to those
who are members of a low caste. Thus "reverse discrimination"
claims by whites affected by affirmative action would disappear.14
Second, it would not be necessary to prove discrimination - either
contemporaneous discrimination against an individual plaintiff or
historical discrimination against that person's group - since the
purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment would not be to prevent or
remedy

discrimination

but

rather

to

alter

"systemic

social

disadvantage."
12. Id. at 2429 (emphasis omitted).
13. Id. at 2439.
14. See id. at 2452 ("On the account I have offered, there is no constitutional objection to
genuinely remedial race- and sex-conscious policies, at least as a general rule. If a basic goal
is opposition to caste, affirmative action policies are ordinarily permissible." {footnote
omitted)).
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One recurring criticism of affirmative action programs points to
the absence of "any neutral decisionmaking mechanisms" for decid
ing which groups deserve special treatment and describes the result
as "a crude political struggle between groups seeking favored sta
tus."15 In response to such criticism, Sunstein offers two criteria for
selecting groups:

(1) a highly visible, morally irrelevant characteris

tic; and (2) systemic social disadvantage.
It is not entirely clear why Sunstein insists under his principle
that a necessary feature of a low-caste group is a "highly visible"
characteristic. Part of his rationale appears to be a theory that low
caste status is created in part by market forces that "rationally" use
race and gender as "cheap proxies" for costly but more accurate
methods of acquiring information about morally relevant individual
traits, such as educational attainment or work ethic.16 A second,
related rationale is that a "highly visible" characteristic "will proba
bly trigger reactions from others in a wide variety of spheres," thus
causing social disadvantage to be "systemic."17 Common to both
rationales is the assumption that the primary disadvantage of being
a member of a low caste derives from the psychological attitudes,
and consequent behavior, of a person's contemporaries who have
power over various aspects of life (for example, prospective em
ployers, teachers, police officers). Sunstein emphasizes the behav
ior of a person's "contemporaries" because a history of
discrimination against a group is not a necessary criterion for low
caste status under his analysis;18 rather, he assumes that high visibil
ity of group status is necessary and sufficient to cause caste effects.19
Sunstein's second criterion is systematic social disadvantage:
"[T]he inquiry into caste has a large empirical dimension . . . fo
cus[ing] on whether one group is systematically below others along
15. Morris B. Abram, Affirmative Action: Fair Shakers and Social Engineers, 99 HARV.
L. REv. 1312, 1321 (1986). Writing for herself and three other justices in City of Richmond v.
J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989), Justice O'Connor stated that one reason that race
based affirmative action required strict scrutiny was the risk of "simple racial politics, " 488
U.S. at 493, noting that a majority of the city council that adopted a plan favoring African
American contractors were themselves African American. See 488 U. S. at 495.
16. See Sunstein, supra note 6, at 2416, 2430-31.
17. Id. at 2432-33.
18. See id. at 2433. Sunstein does add that a history of discrimination is "highly prob
able " for low-caste groups. See id.
19. See id. at 2432 ("When the group characteristic is not highly visible, we cannot have a
caste system as I understand here . . . . ") ; id. at 2431 ("The [caste] system can operate largely
because of the high visibility of the group characteristic."). Sunstein does also state that
"[f]or some purposes .. . it might make sense to speak as well of characteristics that, while
not highly visible, are easily verified. " Id. at 2432. But he goes on to say that "the argument
I am making works best when the morally irrelevant characteristic is highly visible." Id.
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important dimensions of social welfare."2° For Sunstein the key
dimensions are income level, rate of employment, level of educa
tion, longevity, crime victimization, and ratio of elected political
representatives to percentage of population.21
Sunstein would apply his anticaste principle to extend affirma
tive action from African Americans, the original "low caste" that
concerned the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment, to women.
Jews, Asian Americans, and homosexuals would be excluded be
cause the latter three groups do not place low on his scale of socio
economic indicators and thus do not meet the systemic social
disadvantage criteria. 22 His principle would also exclude homosex
uals and the poor on the separate ground that these groups are not
visually identifiable.23
The Fourteenth Amendment by its terms looks to the legislature
to implement the guarantee of equality. Sunstein links the shift
from the original anticaste principle to the current antidiscrimina
tion interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment - "one of the
great untold stories of American constitutional history"24 - to a
twentieth-century transfer of responsibility and authority from
Congress to the courts. As courts assumed a primary role, they re
cast the guarantee of equality in terms of the antidiscrimination
principle - persons similarly situated must be treated similarly which was more hospitable to judicial thinking and amenable to ju
dicial processes. In contrast, Sunstein asserts, the "judiciary simply
lacks the necessary tools to implement the anticaste principle . . .
[which], if taken seriously, calls for significant restructuring of social
practices. For this reason legislative and administrative bodies, with
their superior democratic pedigree and fact-finding capacities, can
better implement the principle ...

.

"25

20. Id. at 2444.
21. See id. at 2429, 2444-49 (citing data comparing African Americans to whites and
women to men).
22. See id. at 2443-44.
23. See id. at 2433 & n.74 (excluding homosexuals); id. at 2438 (excluding the poor).
Farber and Sherry's "pariah principle," although also based on an analogy to the Indian caste
system, differs from Sunstein's anticaste principle by protecting homosexuals, because they
are - like India's "untouchables" - treated as extreme social outcasts; socioeconomic con
dition and visually identifiable group status are not relevant to their use of the caste analogy.
See Farber & Sherry, supra note 8, at 272-73.
24. Sunstein, supra note 6, at 2440.
25. Id.
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Although Sunstein includes a qualifier that his use of "caste"
differs in some degree from the features of what he calls "genuine
caste systems" such as India, he does assume that his theory con
forms to the basic features of India's caste system.

Indeed he

counts on the aptness of the analogy to provide both coherence and
moral force to his thesis: "[T]he similarities between true caste sys
tems and existing American inequalities are what make our current
practices a reason for collective concern."26 We agree that the anal
ogy is apt and powerful, and the general framework of his analysis
tracks the Indian experience well. However, there are also striking
contrasts between the way Sunstein imagines his anticaste principle
would be implemented and the reality of India's fifty years of con
stitutional jurisprudence. The contrasts do not detract from the
value of the caste analogy; but they should, we think, prompt fur
ther and perhaps even more fundamental rethinking of the Ameri
can approach to affirmative action.
The persistent metaphoric use of "caste" seems to arise out of a
need for several kinds of semantic resources. First, the term is
more general than "race" and is felt to be a coherent category that
includes otherwise seemingly disparate groups claiming need for af
firmative action. Second, it connects disadvantage to social struc
ture rather than simply cognitive bias or hostility. Third, it gives
defenders of affirmative action a rhetorical moral imperative that
counteracts the force of the "colorblind" position.27 Perhaps
"caste" mobilizes these resources precisely because its use connects
the American dilemma in deep ways to a phenomenon that is truly
global. If so, points of similarity and contrast between societies like
the United States and India may both be highly salient.
One difference is that Sunstein's anticaste principle seems to fo
cus only on the disadvantages created by a caste system. The his
toric caste system in India was truly systemic: everyone had a place
within it. As a result, the caste system not only drastically exploited
and disadvantaged certain groups, such as the erstwhile untouch
ables; it also concentrated advantage in other groups, such as the
Brahmins. Both suffering and success were largely attributable to
where one was born into the social hierarchy rather than individual
effort and virtue. Thus, India's approach to affirmative action has a
26. Id. at 2429.
27. Being against "caste " rather than "color-conscious " seems a move similar to being
"pro-choice " as an alternative to being "anti-life " in the abortion debate.
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more complex origin than the comparable civil rights movement in
the United States.28 Two different efforts converged in the early
twentieth century to change the caste system, one starting at the
bottom (the "backward classes" movement), and another more
mass-based initiative attacking the top (the anti-Brahmin move
ment). When the drafters of India's constitution met in 1948, they
were confronted not only with demands to alleviate the suffering of
a pitiful minority, but also to reduce the power of a privileged elite
and redistribute the benefits they had monopolized (particularly
seats in higher education and positions in government employment)
to a larger segment of the population - "turning the caste system
on its head." The drafters worked out a complex compromise, fur
ther developed by the courts, that has served to regulate this slow
motion social ·revolution by insisting that reservation programs be
developed through a transparent, rationalized process to avoid a
political spoils system and imposing limits that leave open some av
enues for advancement based on merit.29 In contrast, Sunstein does
not seem to contemplate that his anticaste principle would have sig
nificant long-term redistributive effects: "The anticaste principle
seems to have greatest appeal in discrete contexts ... in which there
will be no major threat to a market economy; and in which the costs
of implementation are most unlikely to be terribly high."30
In addition to contemplating more limited reform, Sunstein's
anticaste principle makes basic assumptions about caste in the
United States that differ in two crucial respects from the caste sys
tem in India.

First, the Indian caste system operates without

"highly visible" physiological characteristics; a high-caste Indian
might be physically very similar to a low-caste Indian. Second,
Sunstein describes a caste system as using social and legal structures
to turn highly visible differences "into systematic social disadvan
tages,"31 yet in India causation worked in the other direction. So
cial and legal structures began with systemic social disadvantage
28. The leading study of the development of India's affirm ative action jurisprudence by
an American legal scholar is MARc GALANIER, COMPETING EauALmES: LAW AND THE
BACKWARD CLASSES IN !NDIA (1984). Another excellent book, by an American political
scientist, that also covers important events after Galanter's work was published, is SUNITA
PARIKH, THE PoLmcs OF PREFERENCE: DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS AND AFFIRMATIVE Ac.
TION IN THE UNITED STATES AND !NDIA (1997). A collection of essays by leading Indian
intellectuals, including several critiques of the current system of affirmative action in India,
can be found in CASTE: !TS TwENTIETH CENTURY AVATAR (M.N. Srinivas ed., 1996).
29. See Clark D. Cunningham & N.R. Madhava Menon, Seeking Equality in Multicultural
Societies (visited Mar. 18, 1999) <http://ls.wustl.edu/Conferences!Equality/art-23index.html>.
30. Sunstein, supra note 6, at 2438.
31. Id. at 2429 (emphasis omitted); see also id. at 2430 ("the highly visible but morally
irrelevant characteristic that gives rise to lower-caste status") (emphasis added); id. at 2433
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and then created stigmatic differences (distinctive garb, segregation,
and practices of physical avoidance) to mark the disadvantage.32
Perhaps because caste in India is so clearly a social construction
- in contrast to continuing folk beliefs in the United States that
"race" is an immutable and obvious physical condition - Indian
jurisprudence has advanced well beyond American law in con
structing and justifying affirmative action in terms of underlying so
cial features as disclosed by empirical research. Instead of relying
on folk categories, Indian law has created a set of artificial legal
categories: Scheduled Castes ("SCs"), the referent of which are the
formerly untouchable castes; Scheduled Tribes ("STs"), referring to
isolated hill groups with aboriginal cultural features; and the "other
backward classes" ("OBCs"), the most interesting and controversial
category. The OBC category extends the principle of affirmative
action in education and government employment from the paradig
matic case of the untouchables to "socially and educationally back
ward classes of citizens."

Considered in light of the current

American "all or nothing" debate over whether race or class should
be the basis for affirmative action, the Indian approach is particu
larly thought-provoking: both traditional low-caste status and eco
nomic class are factors in determining whether a

group is

categorized as an OBC, but neither by itself is considered sufficient.
The definition of OBC, found in the constitutional text, refers to
"social and economic" backwardness rather than economic status;
the deliberate use of the term "classes" rather than "castes" has
been interpreted by the Indian Supreme Court to refer to general
social groupings rather than economic classes. Indeed, experiments
several decades ago in India which relied entirely on economic sta
tus had results similar to those predicted by American opponents of
the "class" approach: lower income members of more privileged
communities took virtually all the reservations.
Sunstein's proposal and the Indian approach have in common
the use of such empirical data as income and educational attain
ment. India has boldly explored "the path not taken" in Bakke,
identifying more than

3,500 distinct social groups as needing

prefer

ential treatment and reserving up to fifty percent of all new central
government jobs for members of these groups. Similar quotas exist
for higher education, including exclusive medical and engineering
schools. This system has been fifty years in the making, going back
("Under the principle I am describing, a history of discrimination is not a necessary condition
for status as a lower caste, though in practice such a history is highly probable.").
32. See Cunningham & Menon, supra note 29.
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to explicit provisions in India's constitutional guarantees of equality
that authorize the government to make "special provision" for "so
cially and educationally backward classes." In the first three de
cades, selection of groups to receive preferential treatment was left
largely to state governments, with the result that the Indian
Supreme Court repeatedly struck down plans that seemed primarily
to benefit politically powerful groups or that were based on tradi
tional assumptions about caste-based prejudice without empirical
research to show which groups were truly in greatest need. Then, in

1980,

the President of India appointed a commission (the Mandal

Commission), which conducted a nationwide survey that used a va
riety of empirical factors - including social discrimination, educa
tional deprivation and economic status - to define groups in need,
producing the list of

3,500 "backward classes."33

Where Sunstein's theory and Indian reality part company is
over the basic unit of group definition, which of course must be
determined before relative socioeconomic status can be evaluated.
Consistent with the core meaning of caste as descent group, in India
the unit that is tested for potential OBC status is a group that prac
tices extensive endogamy, restricting marriage to other group mem
bers. Castes are paradigmatic but not exclusive examples of such
groups. Endogamy not only provides clear group boundaries but
also plays a major role in the intergenerational transmission of in
equality. In contrast, Sunstein's two groups - African Americans
and women - are each constituted in utterly different ways, and
for women, group status has no intergenerational effects: they are
born to rich and poor alike.
Sunstein does not address whether the two groups he identifies
might have differential needs for affirmative action, a sticky ques
tion so far largely avoided in American affirmative action jurispru
dence.34 India, though, has tackled this issue in a variety of ways.
The Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, considered the most
disadvantaged in every respect, each have their own separate quo
tas that are generally proportional to their share of the population
33. See Cunningham & Menon, supra note 29.
34. But see City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 506 (1989) (criticizing the
"random inclusion" of Aleut, Eskimo, and Oriental categories in municipal affirmative action
plan); Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 962-66 (5th Cir. 1996) (Wiener, J., concurring) (hold
ing law school admission program to violate Equal Protection Clause because it was not
narrowly tailored: it ignored non-Mexican Hispanic Americans, Asian Americans, and Na
tive Americans); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 965 F. Supp. 1556, 1580 (D. Colo. 1997)
(finding federal affirmative action program for awarding government contracts not narrowly
tailored because it included such groups as Aleuts, Samoans, and Bhutans, without evidence
that they needed preferential treatment).
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at the state level; they do not have to compete for these reserved
seats against the more populous and frequently more affluent and
influential OBCs. The OBCs often receive a reservation smaller
than their population share because in many states the sum of the
SC, ST, and OBC population exceeds fifty percent; the Supreme
Court has capped total reservations at fifty percent, which means
that the OBCs receive only what is left of the fifty percent available
for reservation after the SC and ST quotas have been set aside.35
Some states have begun replicating the SC/OBC dichotomy by cre
ating two categories of OBCs: more and less backward.
In 1992, the Indian Supreme Court created a further level of
differentiation within beneficiary groups by imposing a means test
for individual eligibility.36 This "creamy layer" approach addresses
two different but related concerns: (1) that the benefits of reserva
tions are not distributed evenly throughout a backward group but
instead are monopolized by persons at the socioeconomic top of the
group; and (2) that reservations are going to persons who do not in
fact need them because they have been raised in privileged circum
stances due to parental success in overcoming the disadvantaged
status of the backward group.37 In contrast, Sunstein seems to as
sume that evidence of low socioeconomic status of a person's
ascribed group (an ascription apparently based only on the individ
ual's physical appearance, the "highly visible characteristic") is suf
ficient

to

assumption

demonstrate
that

that

underlies

person's

most

own

American

disadvantage,
affirmative

an

action

programs.38
As to the role of the different branches of government, the
Indian approach is consistent with Sunstein's anticaste principle:
the legislative and executive branches in India have the power and
responsibility to initiate affirmative action schemes, and, at their
best, do utilize their greater factfinding abilities and more flexible
procedures to this end. But the vote bloc potential of affirmative
action programming39 has led to abuse and public distrust. As a
35. See Rethinking Equality Conference, supra note 10, at 1598-99 (panel presentation by
Justice B.P. Jeevan Reddy); B.P. Jeevan Reddy, Equality and Social Justice: Rethinking
Equality in the Global Society (visited Feb. 19, 1999) <http://ls.wustl.edu/Conferences/Equal
ity/reddy3.html>.
36. See Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1993 S.C. 477 (India).
37. See Cunningham & Menon, supra note 29; Rethinking Equality Conference, supra
note 10, 1597-98 (panel presentation by Justice B.P. Jeevan Reddy).
38. See Adarand, 965 F. Supp. at 1580 (criticizing federal affirmative action programs for
contracting as overinclusive because they presume "that all those in the named minority
groups are economically . . . disadvantaged").
39. See PARIKH, supra note 28, at 169-92.
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result, the judiciary in India has played a more active role than
Sunstein contemplates under his anticaste principle, both in impos
ing objective and transparent procedures for program design and
also in actual policymaking, particularly by striking balances among
the competing interests articulated in the constitutional text.40 The
Indian Supreme Court has also bolstered the legitimacy of political
decisions. In 1990, proposed executive action to expand reserva
tions led to widespread protest and urban unrest; yet when the
Supreme Court two years later approved most of the proposed
changes, public acceptance was equally widespread.41
C ONCLUSION

The Indian "anticaste principle" incorporates, rather than sup
plants, a general antidiscrimination principle. Like the "colorblind
Constitution," Indian equality jurisprudence aspires to secure a so
ciety free of all distinctions based on caste; but at the same time, it
permits as a necessary means to that end caste-based remedial pro
grams - but only when those programs are carefully designed, lim
ited,

and

self-liquidating

over

time.

Anticaste

and

antidiscrimination principles are integrated into a single jurispru
dence in which both equality and discrimination have more com
plex meanings than in American legal discourse. Substantive and
not merely formal equality is guaranteed, and discrimination can be
"positive" and "compensatory."42
The Indian perspective is that the basic philosophy of affirma
tive action is nothing but the rationale of a just and fair social order.
Affirmative action is not an exception to equality of treatment, but
a method of providing it, by enabling all individuals to perform ac
cording to their potentials.
40. For example, both the 50% cap on total reservations and the creamy layer test were
imposed by the Indian Supreme Court without explicit support in the constitutional text. See
Cunningham & Menon, supra note 29.
41. The fact that the Supreme Court opened its processes to many interested parties and
conducted very many public hearings over a span of months may have contributed to this
result. See id. However, there continues to be strong criticism of the Manda! Commission
Report and the Supreme Court's decision in the Sawhney case from Indian intellectuals. See,
e.g., Rethinking Equality Conference, supra note 10, at 1657-60 (panel presentation by M.N.
Srinivas).
42. Constitutional discourse in the new South Africa, based in part on India's example,
differentiates between "fair " and "unfair" discrimination in permitting various kinds of af
firmative action. See Rethinking Equality Conference, supra note 10, at 1624-28 (panel pres
entation by Karthigasen Govender); id. at 1675 (closing speech by Clark D. Cunningham);
Karthigasen Govender, Equality - The South African Perspective (visited Feb. 19, 1999)
<http://ls.wustl.edu/Conferences/Equality/Gov-art4.htini>.
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There is enough empirical evidence in both India and the
United States to suggest that some sections of society suffer from
social, economic, and cultural disabilities - through no fault of
their own - that deny them equal access to scarce resources.
Therefore, we suggest that government focus primary attention on
designing and implementing affirmative action programs, identifyM
ing beneficiaries, and evaluating the permissible limits of preferenM
tial standards.

The Indian experience with affirmative action,

particularly in the recent past, certainly reveals many pitfalls that
attend different program designs, schemes of certification of benefiM
ciaries, and methods of adjudging compatibility of programs with
constitutional guarantees of equality of opportunity.
India's most difficult problem has been identifying the benefiM
ciaries for affirmative action programs. The initial effort was strucM
tured in terms of caste: the Central Government in India identified
the Scheduled Castes and Tribes, and the Constitution itself proM
vided the methodology of identification. In the case of the SCs and
STs, a problem arose when it was discovered that

(1)

the benefits

were being appropriated by the relatively betterMoffs among
Scheduled Castes, and (2) the beneficiaries could not reach higher
levels of education and employment, despite the reservation, beM
cause of systemic factors for which reservation alone was not the
best solution. A more intractable problem arose when the govemM
ment sought to extend the reservation to "other backward classes"
for which the Constitution had only provided enabling provisions
but not a mechanism for identification. The quick and ready methM
ods of identification adopted by political leaders in different states
were shot down by the courts on the ground of unfair discriminaM
tion. The courts interpreted the "reasonable classification test" of
the equality guarantee to require two criteria:

(1)

that the purpose

of the classification be clear and legitimate, and (2) that there be a
sufficient link between the classification criteria used and the govM
ernmental objectives.
There are two dangers against which affirmative action should
be guarded if it is to survive challenges. First, it must be selfM
liquidating - and seen to be so - in order to redeem itself from
the compulsions of electoral politics inevitable in democratic socieM
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ties.43 Second, we must reassess existing strategies in light of better
knowledge of social reality now available from the social sciences.44
What would an American affirmative action plan for law school
admissions look like if it made use of caste-like categories? The
likely effect would be to reduce the absolute number of persons
eligible for affirmative action in comparison to conventional race
based plans, even if the number of identified groups was expanded
somewhat beyond the four commonly listed: black, Hispanic,
Native American and Asian.45 (However, we certainly would not
expect that, like India, a list of

3,500 distinct groups would

be gen

erated!) The Indian approach has been to create artificial groups,
identified by abbreviated functional titles (such as OBC), that use
intersecting cultural, social and economic factors to narrow, not ex
pand, the number of potentially eligible persons. The first limiting
principle is that a person must be a member of a group distin
guished by endogamy. A group that intermarries freely with other
groups, although identifiable in other ways, would not be eligible.46
The second limitation would be that the endogamous group be sig
nificantly below average levels of educational attainment, such as
the percentage of members graduating from high school. The third
factor would consist of a mix of socioeconomic factors indicative of
continuing effects of past discrimination.47 It is likely that such het
erogenous categories as "Asian" and "Hispanic" would break into
much more discrete units, some of which would present more com
pelling cases for affirmative action than others; such a process
might even take place within the group now called African-Ameri
can, which, at least to the eyes of an anthropologist, might also be
43. Affirmative action has a tendency to perpetuate itself, reinforcing the divisions in
society that it is meant to liquidate.
44. For example, Claude Steele, Joshua Aronson, and other psychologists have docu
mented a "stereotype threat effect" that depresses performance by academically skilled
African Americans on standardized tests like the LSAT. Their research shows that African
American test performance can be equalized with comparable white test takers simply by
altering the testing instructions so as to remove the stereotype threat. See Joshua Aronson et
al., Stereotype Threat and the Academic Underperformance of Minorities and Women, in
PREJUDICE: THE TARGET'S PERSPECTIVE 83, 88-90 (Janet K.Swim & Charles Stangor eds.,
1998); Claude M. Steele, A Threat in the Air: How Stereotypes Shape Intellectual Identity and

Performance, 52 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 613, 619-21 (1997).
45. See, e.g.,

Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 205 (1995).

46.

Endogamy is a cultural practice which (1) is likely to be found in groups that suffered
from de jure segregation, (2) is a reliable indicator of continuing de facto segregation, (3) but
is not limited to racial categories, and (4) is likely to reflect the group's own understanding of
its boundaries (both as to extent and permeability).
47. In Cunningham & Menon, supra note 29, we coin the acronym EDISEG to describe
such groups (Educationally Deprived, Involuntarily Segregated, Endogamous Groups).
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quite heterogenous.48 An interesting approach might be to work
backwards from the bottom twenty-five percent of LSAT takers,
looking inductively for clusters of factors that correlate strongly
with low test performance. Such research at the moment would be
seriously limited by the current practice of collecting demographic
data in terms of the five large "racial" categories. This approach
results in such gross generalizations as "Asians do well on the
LSAT and therefore do not need affirmative action." If more pre
cise units, defined by endogamy were used, much smaller groups
within the vague category "Asian" might appear with intersecting
features comparable to current statistics assigned to African Ameri
cans, for example. The resulting set of categories might well pro
duce a system more subtle and more just than simple, and mutually
exclusive, reliance on either "race" or "class."

48. For one such anthropological analysis, see VIRGINIA R. DOMINGUEZ, WHITE BY DEF
SOCIAL CLASSIFICATIONS IN CREOLE LouisIANA (1986). Economist Glenn C.
Loury has argued that affirm ative action is not needed by all African Americans, but instead
should be focused on a distinct group whose members share the following characteristics: (1)
slave descendants, (2) originally rural and Southern, (3) but now emigrated to northern cities,
(4) where they are now "locked in ghettos." See Glenn C. Loury, The Hard Questions:
Double Talk, NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 25, 1997, at 23. He uses the term "caste" in describing
this group. See id.
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